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SYMPOSIUM
THE SOUND OF SILENCE:
REFLECTIONS ON THE USE
OF THE GAG ORDER
FOREWORD
Laurie L. Levenson*
Gag orders are instructions from judges forbidding attorneys to
discuss an ongoing trial with reporters. It never has been
proven that anything written in a newspaper about a trial in
progress has influenced any jury member's vote, especially
when the jurors are warned every day not to read newspaper
stories about the case or listen to the TV or radio news .... Yet
judges, generally the most insecure ones, still issue stringent
gag orders in an attempt to prevent "prejudicial" information
from getting into the papers which the jurors are supposedly not
reading anyway. The judges who impose gag orders say that
they are doing it to ensure the defendant gets a fair trial. '
-Theo Wilson
The issue of whether courts should impose gag orders in high-
publicity cases poses a classic balance of two crucial constitutional
rights-the right to a fair trial and the right of free speech. Even those
who oppose gag orders acknowledge that ensuring a fair trial is a laudable
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School,
William M. Rains Fellow. Thank you to the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal
for sponsoring this timely symposium on gag orders and for giving my husband (Douglas
Mirell) and me something to talk about during our few precious minutes together.
1. Theo Wilson, Headline Justice 71 (1996).
306 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
goal.2  Yet, there is fierce disagreement over whether gag orders are
necessary and effective to ensure that right.3
Gag orders come with a substantial price. The cost of using a gag
order is the limit it places on the free speech rights of the lawyers and
parties in a case. There are two dimensions to this cost. The first is one of
basic principle. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to free speech. One should not have to sacrifice that
right when becoming part of a lawsuit. The other dimension is of a more
practical nature. As we have seen repeatedly during the recent "Trials of
the Century," 4 high-publicity cases are tried in two arenas: in the formal
courtroom and in the court of public opinion. To preserve his or her
reputation, a party may seek redemption not only in the courtroom but also
in the public arena. By the time a court is assigned to a case, the trial in
the public arena may well be in progress. A gag order can restrict the
party's ability to respond to prejudicial information that had been
disseminated prior to the court's order.
For the trial court faced with a complicated trial surrounded by
immense and intense public and media interest, the temptation to rely on
gag orders can be overwhelming. The judge's most immediate concern is
selecting or retaining a fair jury, and although the parties' First
Amendment rights are academically interesting, the most pressing concern
of the day is often finishing the case without a mistrial. The fastest and
easiest way for the court to maintain and keep control of a case is to
impose a gag order. So what if the court must later tailor the contours of
its order? So what if the leaks continue? At least the judge will believe
that he or she is doing what can be done to ensure a fair trial. Reflection
on grand constitutional principles is usually not in the day's schedule.
This gag order symposium is so valuable precisely because it gives
courts the background to reflect on the merits of gag orders before a crisis
is upon them. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky expertly maps the
2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on
Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 311 (1997).
3. The imposition of gag orders has always been a controversial issue. For a history of the
law regarding gag orders and the Bar and media's response to them, see J. EDWARD GERALD,
NEWS OF CRIME 85-114 (1983).
4. There have been at least five "Trials of the Century" in Los Angeles alone during the last
decade. I served as a commentator on most of them. They include: People v. Powell, No.
BA035498, (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1992), United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal.
1993); People v. Williams, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), People v. Menendez,
No. BA068880, 1996 WL 342092, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 1996), People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995), and Rufo v. Simpson, No.
SC031947, 1997 WL 53038, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997).
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constitutional contours of gag orders. The Supreme Court first articulated
a test for prior restraints on the press in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart.
5
That standard makes prior restraints against speech presumptively invalid.
The constitutional standard for gag orders on trial participants has not been
6as well defined. In Gentile v. State Bar, the Court held that attorney
speech could be punished if it posed a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. But that case did not involve a
gag order. Rather, the State Bar disciplined Mr. Gentile for his violations
of that jurisdiction's rules of professional conduct. The United States
Supreme Court has yet to decide what constitutional standard-
"substantial likelihood of prejudice" or "clear and present danger"-
should be used in judging gag orders on attorneys. Professor Chemerinsky
offers his own answer to that question.
Mr. Douglas Mirell continues the constitutional discussion. As he
7notes in his article, courts now seeking to impose gag orders often look to
other codes for guidance in drafting gag orders. One ready guide may be
found in the California Rules of Professional Conduct. On the heels of the
criminal trial of O.J. Simpson, the California Supreme Court adopted Rule
5-120 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. 8 The rule limitsattorney's speech in both criminal and civil trials.
5. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
6. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
7. Douglas E. Mirell, Gag Orders & Attorney Discipline Rules: Why Not Base the Former
Upon the Latter, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 353 (1997).
8. Rule 5-120 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, as applicable to civil cases,
provides:
(A) A member who is participating or has participated in the investigation or
litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
member knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (A), a member may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited
by law, the identity of the person involved;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved,
when there is reason to believe there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or the public interest.
(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (A), a member may make a statement that a
reasonable person would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial
undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the member or the
member's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to
such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
1997]
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For some courts, Rule 5-120 represented a commandment delivered
from on-high. The rule, by its terms, limits attorney speech and therefore
offers an additional mechanism for restraining attorney speech. There is,
however, one significant lingering problem. The constitutionality of Rule
5-120 is still in dispute. Is it void for vagueness? Are its contours still
unconstitutionally overbroad? If Rule 5-120 is a flawed guide, have the
courts turned to a false idol to solve its problems of trial publicity?
All of us participating in this symposium have had a birds'-eye view
into the recent "Trials of the Century"-the civil O.J. Simpson lawsuits9-
serving either as legal commentators or amicus counsel on First
Amendment and media issues. From these vantage points we have been
able to gauge the impact of gag orders on high-profile cases. As Paul
Hoffman's article suggests, it sometimes feels like we have been caught in
a war. Not only have we witnessed the war between the parties to the suit,
we have also observed or participated in "gag" wars that have become a
controversial part of high-publicity trials.'
0
The "gag" war in the civil Simpson proceedings began with the
court's early offensive. Before jury selection began, and without advance
notice, the trial judge issued a sweeping gag order precluding all counsel
from discussing "anything connected with this trial with the media or in
public places. In the First Amendment world, such an order is the
equivalent of a nuclear attack. Taken to its logical (and illogical)
extremes, the court's order would have barred lawyers in the case from
discussing matters privately with each other even in the courtroom which
is, of course, a public place. The ACLU and media lawyers 12 moved to
challenge the order.'3  The trial judge modified his order but the
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-120 (1995).
9. See Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 20, 1994), consolidated
with Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 4, 1995), and Brown v.
Simpson, No. SC036876 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 12, 1995).
10. Paul L. Hoffman, The "Gag" Order in the O.J Simpson Civil Action: Lessons to Be
Learned?, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 333 (1997).
11. Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 20, 1994) (Minute Order
issued Aug. 13, 1996).
12. These lawyers included some of the finest attorneys in the First Amendment field,
including two of the authors of this symposium-Paul Hoffman and Douglas Mirell.
13. Indeed, as discussed in detail by Mr. Hoffman and noted by Professor Robert Pugsley,
the gag order wars are often fought more by proxies than the parties themselves. Media and
First Amendment organizations represent the parties subject to the gag order. Those parties may
be reluctant to wage the battle themselves because they are reluctant to antagonize a trial judge
who will be ruling on many more issues during the course of their trial before him or her. The
court, too, may be represented by a proxy. In many gag order situations, one party may feel a
tactical advantage by having a gag order imposed and will defend the court's right to impose
one, even if it was ordered sua sponte.
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skirmishing continued. A challenge to the gag order was filed in the
California Court of Appeal. Assuming that some type of gag order would
be appropriate, based upon the history of the case rather than specific
findings regarding ongoing improprieties, the Court of Appeal ordered
further modifications of the order.
Even though they won a small victory, opponents of gag orders
worried that they may be losing the war. The Court of Appeal's instinctive
deference to the trial court's right to impose a gag order represents in itself
a gradual erosion of First Amendment standards. 14 The court was no
longer obliged to target for redress specific abuses by counsel. Less
restrictive alternatives for protecting a jury did not appear on the court's
radar scope. Rather, the court immediately sought to use the most
powerful weapon in its arsenal-the gag order.
If the court's order in the Simpson civil case represents a trend, there
may indeed be good reason to worry about the devaluation of First
Amendment rights in high-profile cases. Dismissing the order as an
extreme act during extreme times offers little comfort. Although it would
be nice to think of the Simpson case as the last "Trial of the Century" in
which such an extreme approach is necessary, the next century is almost
upon us and so is the next major trial. Even before the year 2000, two
cases demanding nationwide attention will be tried and others loom on the
horizon. 15 The broad gag order imposed in the Simpson case is likely to
be used as support for court measures to limit the dissemination of
information in upcoming civil and criminal cases.
A gag order is only one of the weapons that a trial court has in its
arsenal to prevent a trial from becoming a "media circus." Hand in hand
with the debate over gag orders is the argument over whether cameras
should be allowed in the courtroom. In his essay, Professor Robert
Pugsley praises Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki's decision to ban cameras from the
Simpson civil trial. For him, a gag order was not enough. To ensure the
parties' right to a fair trial, the cameras also had to be turned off.
Pugsley's position is a controversial one. Both the gag order and the
order banning cameras limited the public's access to first hand information
regarding the trial. In hindsight, was this a good thing? If the public could
14. See generally, Hoffman, supra note 11.
15. The trial of Timothy McVeigh for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City is scheduled to begin on March 31, 1997. His co-defendant, Terry
Nichols, will be tried separately at a date yet to be determined. The first trial of Theodore
Kaczynski (the suspected "Unabomber") is scheduled to begin in Sacramento, California, on
November 12, 1997. A second trial in New Jersey has yet to be scheduled but will not begin
before 1998.
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have seen the civil trial, might there have been more understanding of the
different verdicts in the civil and criminal cases? Would the cameras have
really jeopardized the integrity of a case in which the jury had already been
flooded with information from the criminal trial? Is it fair and accurate to
assume that Judge Fujisaki, who ruled the civil case with an iron fist, could
not have prevented a recurrence of the showboating that characterized the
criminal trial?
In the end, the question of what is the greater evil-the
uncalculatable risk to a fair trial or the infringement on the parties' right to
speak and the public's right to know--depends on a balancing of rights
and interests. From my perspective, I doubt that gag orders will ever work
to stem the tide of leaks of information that inevitably occur in a high-
profile case. Instead, they tend to drive the media underground and put a
premium on clever media manipulation.
I worry greatly that we will seal off the public from seeing what is
occurring in our courtrooms. Good, bad, or ugly, the justice system is
accountable to the people. Even the civil justice system, which is designed
to address disputes between parties, has an impact on the community.
There are solutions other than gag orders and television "kill switches"
that can prevent the media circus. One is the solution that Judge Fujisaki
ultimately selected when he realized that he could neither stem the tide of
leaks under the gag order nor put his jurors in a sequestered bubble. Judge
Fujisaki appealed to the participants' sense of responsibility. On the eve
of the verdict, when the jury was going home among a swirl of media
coverage, Judge Fujisaki asked everyone to exercise restraint. He asked a
dismissed juror not to discuss her deliberations; he asked the jurors not to
watch television or read press accounts of the case; he asked the media not
to hound the dismissed juror for her inside story. Guess what? It worked.
The media continued to do its job and the jurors theirs. The First
Amendment and Sixth Amendment moved forward in peaceful
coexistence.
I am not so naive as to believe that gag orders will never be
appropriate or that the media will act responsibly when the next salacious
court story hits. The pressures of covering high-profile cases often lead
both the media and courts to overreact. It seems clear, however, that we
are more likely to reach better decisions regarding these important issues if
we reflect on them during our few precious moments between "Trials of
the Century." This symposium provides an excellent opportunity to do
just that.
